This paper concerns the possibility of “thinking” God, and uses the work of Emmanuel Levinas to frame a contemporary approach to some of the problems involved. The difficult relationship between philosophy and Christian theology is noted, before Levinas’s thought is examined as it relates to that which both marks consciousness and exceeds it. Levinas’s adoption of the “idea of the Infinite” and hisexploration of two ways in which the Infinite might signify (have meaning) open up a useful trajectory for a (...) thought of God which is not reductive. At the same time, however, this aporetic approach raises difficulties in the context of specific religious traditions. Three problems as they occur for Christian theology are examined in the light of Levinas’s work: the problem of not being able to identify an experience of God as such; the problem of the infinite interpretability of revelation; and the problem of understanding the divinity of Jesus Christ. (shrink)

Chris Horner opens our debate on pragmatism with this handy introduction to the subject. Those entirely new to the topic of pragmatism might also find helpful Stephen Law's article (see issue 2 of Think).

Contraception works by preventing fertilization of an egg or preventing implantation of a fertilized embryo. For those who believe pregnancy begins at implantation, contraceptives preventing implantation are not abortifacient. However, for those who assert that pregnancy begins at fertilization, any agent causing the intentional loss of an embryo, even prior to implantation, is abortifacient, both morally and for lack of a different term to describe the postfertilization, preimplantation loss. In the debate on this topic, much of the discourse on both (...) sides wrongly focuses on the opposing side's perceived ignorance in denying scientifically proven definitions rather than on the substance of the conflict. Indeed, both sides accuse the other of prioritizing its “subjective” views over “objective” facts. In this essay, we unpack the scientific, cultural, and religious factors that underlie this debate. We argue that the only way to move forward is to clarify our terminology and engage with the substance of the argument, rather than merely the rhetoric. (shrink)

Investors with standard monetary preferences will give a fund manager incentives to increase firm profits, which can be achieved through a share in profits via carried interest. When investors have social preferences, it is not clear which incentives the manager should receive. We explore this puzzle by applying an agency theory perspective to impact investing, a practice where investors seek both financial returns and a measurable social or environmental impact. Using an inductive, qualitative approach, we identify and describe the ethical (...) tensions and challenges faced by fund managers to structure and implement impact-based variable compensation schemes. Our results indicate that economic incentives tied to non-financial objectives are useful to alleviate goal incongruity between principals and agents during fund creation but have the potential to lead to perverse effects during the fund lifecycle, where managers may exploit subjective non-financial metrics to maximize personal wealth. We introduce the concept of impact fidelity, a conceptual equivalent of fiduciary duty, to ensure that investment decisions reflect the asset owner’s impact preferences. (shrink)

Given the enduring debate over what constitutes quality, and therefore appropriate training, in clinical ethics consultation, it is unsurprising that there is variation in the structure and content of clinical ethics fellowship programs. However, this variation raises questions about the value of fellowship training when the ethicists that emerge from these programs might be quite different. The specifics of fellowship programs are largely internal. As such, the extent of variation and whether such variation is problematic remains unclear. In this article, (...) we summarize lessons learned from discussions between fellows, their mentors and program directors at the 2020 Clinical Ethics UnConference, and outline some possible ways to advance the conversation about variation in fellowship programs and training. We argue for the more open sharing of training specifics in order to help break down the siloed nature of fellowship programs. Greater transparency could, firstly, allow for more robust reflection on and refinement of training practices and, secondly, allow us to better balance professionally appropriate consistency with unavoidable or desirable variation based on local norms, culture and leadership. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Pragmatist in Paris: Frédéric Rauh’s “Task of Dissolution”Richard HornerIntroductionRichard Rorty has suggested that we think of “pragmatism in the professorial sense” as “just a repudiation of the quest for certainty and foundations.” 1 In other words think of a pragmatist as someone who links the quest for privileged method with the quest for foundational knowledge and gives up both. As Rorty explained several years ago,If one believes, as (...) I do, that the traditional ideas of “an absolute (‘objective’) conception of reality” and of “scientific method” are neither clear nor useful, then one will see the interlocked questions “What should be the method of the social sciences?” and “What are the criteria of an objective moral theory?” as badly posed. 2Pragmatists not only give up the quest for grounding, foundations, or essences, then, but they also understand that the dissolution of essences leads in turn to “the dissolution of inquiry into a self-reweaving web of beliefs.” If this “seems wacky to you,” Rorty notes, “consider that such a dissolution is a natural and [End Page 289] easy consequence of a generalized antiessentialism.” 3 Whether he speaks in terms of foundations or essences, Rorty’s message remains the same: pragmatists not only let go of the quest for foundations, they also let go of the quest for privileged method.Perhaps the principle difficulty with this way of defining pragmatism is that not very many people seem to qualify as pragmatists. What Rorty has been able to do with remarkable consistency, others have been less willing and less able to do. There are, of course, still numerous foundationalists among us who are explicit about their commitment to the quest for foundations and to the quest for method that accompanies it. While anti-foundationalism may be all the rage, “it would be too much to say that the foundationalist argument lies in ruins. It is in fact remarkably resilient and resourceful in the face of attacks against it.” 4 Furthermore, even where the “death of foundationalism” is a given, 5 the quest for method continues to hold interest. To cite only one notable example among many, Jürgen Habermas may have successfully resisted the seductive attraction of the quest for Letzbegründung or ultimate foundations, but he clearly remains committed to “a metahermeneutical analysis” of communication, the purpose of which is “to identify universals and thus to produce a type of theoretical knowledge.” 6 This kind of “anti-foundationalist theory hope,” 7 can be found among Deweyan pragmatists as well. While many of them let go of the quest for foundations with relative ease, they find it difficult to abandon the quest for method 8 or to allow the epistemological enterprise to succumb to Rorty’s “vulgar pragmatism.” 9 Furthermore, in doing so they believe that Dewey would have sided with them rather than with Rorty.Given the difficulty in identifying pragmatists who have consistently abandoned both quests, it is especially striking to discover Frédéric Rauh practicing “pragmatism in the professorial sense” in the philosophy section of the Faculté [End Page 290] des lettres of the Sorbonne and Ecole normale supérieure during the first decade of the twentieth century. While this period of French history certainly produced intellectuals who were sympathetic to the American pragmatists, these intellectuals were, as Durkheim noted, “far from subscribing to all their theses.” 10 Renouvier, for instance, remained, in James’s own words, “too classic in the general rationalism of his procedure.” 11 Similarly, James’s good friend Boutroux, though “simpatico” toward American pragmatism, also “betrayed... a philosophical inheritance quite foreign to that of James.” 12 Ralph Barton Perry, comes to a similar conclusion with regard to Bergson, writing that Bergson and James “exchanged salutations and gifts, and then proceeded on their way. In no sense did they coincide either as systems or in their particular theorems.” 13 Apparent alliances, then, emerge finally as “misalliances,” showing that “what has passed as pragmatism in European philosophical thought has not been distinctive of the essential and most important features of American pragmatism.” 14 Whatever their affinities with pragmatism may have been and whatever their contributions to dissolving the... (shrink)

With the growth and evolution of the field of clinical ethics, the one constant has been its variation. Resolving ethical issues at the bedside is done differently across the country based on one’s...

There are many tangled normative and technical questions involved in evaluating the quality of software used in epidemiological simulations. In this paper we answer some of these questions and offer practical guidance to practitioners, funders, scientific journals, and consumers of epidemiological research. The heart of our paper is a case study of the Imperial College London covid-19 simulator, set in the context of recent work in epistemology of simulation and philosophy of epidemiology.

This paper reviews the concept of professional autonomy from anhistorical perspective. It became formalised in the United Kingdom onlyafter a long struggle throughout most of the nineteenth century. In itspure form professional autonomy implies unlimited powers to undertakemedical investigations and to prescribe treatment, irrespective of cost.Doctors alone should determine the quality of care and the levels ofremuneration to which they should be entitled. In the second half of thetwentieth century a steady erosion of professional autonomy occurred inthe United Kingdom. The (...) level of remuneration has been restricted formost doctors for nearly fifty years, whilst the costs of health carehave steadily reduced the doctor's ability to provide unrestricted carewithin the health care system. Reorganisation of the National HealthService in 1983 and 1991 has substantially eroded professional autonomy,to the point where research developments, clinical judgement and ethicalstandards are all now being placed at risk. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Marion is one of the leading Catholic thinkers of our time: a formidable authority on Descartes and a major scholar in the philosophy of religion. This book presents a concise, accessible, and engaging introduction to the theology of Jean-Luc Marion. Described as one of the leading thinkers of his generation, Marion's take on the postmodern is richly enhanced by his expertise in patristic and mystical theology, phenomenology, and modern philosophy. In this first introduction to Marion's thought, Robyn Horner (...) provides the essential background to Marion's work, as well as analysing the most significant themes for contemporary theology. This book serves as an ideal starting point for students of theology and philosophy, as well as for those seeking to further their knowledge of cutting-edge thinking in contemporary theology. (shrink)

Gestational surrogacy relies on a legal agreement between the surrogate and the intended parents to define the roles and responsibilities of the parties, including explicit consent by the surrogate to allow the physician to release all pregnancy-related medical information to the intended parents. In the event of surrogate misconduct, however, physicians may feel conflicted if the surrogate asks the physician to withhold information about potentially dangerous behaviour in pregnancy from the intended parents. While the American Society for Reproductive Medicine guidelines (...) may support disclosure over the objections of the surrogate, the authors argue that such disclosure is a violation of the surrogate’s rights and the physician’s ethical and professional duties. A surrogate’s confidentiality must be maintained as it is an essential element of the physician–patient relationship. (shrink)

Die von Anselm von Canterbury in seinem Werk „Cur Deus homo" gestellte Frage nach dem Warum der Menschwerdung und des Kreuzestodes beschäftigte im Mittelalter auch Verfasser deutschsprachiger Dichtungen. Darüber ist bislang wenig bekannt. Die untersuchten Alanus-Rezeptionen, Kreuzesholzlegenden und jene Texte, die den Streit der vier Töchter Gottes behandeln, sind zwar völlig verschiedene Werke, sie legen aber ein ganz bestimmtes Muster zugrunde, mit dessen Hilfe sie einige Gedanken aus Anselms Satisfaktionslehre verarbeiten. Dadurch erreichen auch sie das Ziel, die Schwere der Sünde (...) und die Notwendigkeit der Erlösung aufzuzuzeigen. Sie kristallisieren heraus, daß die Errettung der Menschheit ausschließlich durch die Genugtuung vollzogen und diese nur durch einen Gottmenschen geleistet werden konnte. Die so vollbrachte Erlösungstat erscheint als Akt der göttlichen Barmherzigkeit, die in den literarischen Darstellungen vom Fall im Paradies bis zur Erlösung stets präsent ist.The question, which Anselm of Canterbury formulated in his publication „Cur Deus homo" why incarnation and the Cross-Death ist necessary, engaged in the Middle Ages also authors of german poetry. About that, little is known up to now. No doubt, the investigated reception of Alanus, the legend of the cross piece and those texts, which deal with the dispute of the four daughters of God are indeed different texts, yet they base upon a very certain pattern through which they work up conceptions of Anselms theory of satisfaction. By this adaptation they also achieve to point out the severity of sin and the necessity of salvation. They make evident that the salvation of mankind is exclusively fulfilled by satisfaction, whereby this could be soly accomplished by God incarnate. Beginning with the fall in paradise the fulfilled salvation is always evident in the poetic texts as an act of compassion by God. (shrink)

The apostle Paul employed many techniques that demonstrated his leadership. One of the most understated instances of that is in his ‘Fool’s Speech’ in 2 Corinthians 11:16- 12:13. Paul flaunted his rhetorical skills in calling attention to his own shortcomings, in lampooning his opponents, and in revealing the source of his assurance for foolishness. This article evaluates Paul’s rhetorical masterpiece calling the Corinthians to humble submission to his apostleship by synthesizing the work of both Jennifer Glancy and Lawrence Welborn with (...) Don Howell. [All Scriptural quotes are taken from the New American Standard Bible © 1977]. (shrink)

The comments accompanying Proposition (Prop.) 11 (“God... necessarily exists”) in Part I of Spinoza’s The Ethics contain sketches of what appear to be at least three more or less distinct ontological arguments. The first of these is problematic even on its own terms. More is true: even the proposition “God exists” (GE), a consequence of Prop. 11, cannot be derived from the definitions and axioms of Part I (the “DAPI”) of The Ethics; thus, Prop. 11 cannot be derived from the (...) DAPI, either. To prove these claims, I use an automated deduction system (ADS) to show that Prop. 11 is independent of the DAPI. I then augment the DAPI with some auxiliary assumptions I believe Spinoza would accept and that sustain an automated derivation of (GE). The results illustrate how an ADS can facilitate the analysis of arguments and yield an apparently novel argument cast in the style of Spinoza. (shrink)

This paper provides a reply to articles by Nicola Angius and Guiseppe Primiero responding to our paper “Software Intensive Science”.

While one of the arguments against religious belief relates to its apparent irrationality, it can be shown phenomenologically that there is a different kind of rationality at work in religious knowledge, undermining the sharp distinction between sacred and secular that enables theology to be marginalised as irrational. Approaching Christianity through the category of revelation, that is, as a way of living and believing that draws not only on founding narratives of revelation but on the ongoing ‘experience’ of transcendence in unveiling (...) truth, I seek to examine how the possibility of truth itself can inspire hatred and so open onto violence. ‘Religious’ violence typically emerges from a hatred directed at otherness. Hatred of what truth reveals is a powerful motivation for violence, but it cannot be shown that this is specifically religious. Nevertheless, otherness is characterised by an excess that resists objectification and may be revelatory of truth. Violence may be religious precisely to the extent that it is directed against the otherness before which each person stands accused. (shrink)

Religious and atheistic belief are presented anew in a volume of essays from leading phenomenologists in both France and the UK. Atheism, often presented as the negation of religious belief, is here engaged with from a phenomenologically informed notion of experience. The focus on experience, sparks new debates in readings of belief, faith and atheism as they relate to and complicate each other. What unites the contributors is their relationship to phenomenology as it has developed in France in the wake (...) of Heidegger and Husserl. Leading French intellectuals from this context, Jean-Luc Nancy, Quentin Meillassoux, and Catherine Malabou, amongst others, contribute arresting ideas on atheistic faith, the death of God, and anarchic faith, opening up new areas of understanding in a field whose parameters and core concepts are ever shifting. Revealing the extent to which religious and atheistic belief must be seen to influence, and on a fundamental level, to co-create one another, the pluralistic society in which religious belief is counted as one option amongst many is given primacy. The fact that religious faith has become not only optional but also, in many contexts, strangely alienated from society, deeply modifies the experience of the believer as much as that of the non-believer. A focus on 'experience', over and above 'belief', moves us towards a mode of experiential knowledge which refuses to privilege the atheistic believer and deride the reality of religious belief. (shrink)

Thomas von Aquin behandelt in der Catena aurea jeweils ein Einzelevangelium und kommentiert es durch Autoritätenzitate. Da diese Exzerpte zahlreiche Informationen aus dem Viererkanon zum Inhalt haben, nimmt Thomas stets alle vier Evangelien in den Blick. Sie werden als Ergänzungen und Erklärungen einer Bibelstelle genutzt; insbesondere werden evangelienharmonistische Reflexionen über fehlende und unterschiedliche Aussagen der Evangelisten vorgenommen. Thomas stellt sich in die Reihe der Persönlichkeiten, die bereits dem Vorwurf, die Evangelien enthielten Widersprüche, mit dem Nachweis der Widerspruchslosigkeit zu begegnen suchten. (...) Veranschaulicht wird das harmonistische Bemühen auf der Grundlage der ostmitteldeutschen Übersetzung der Catena aurea super Marcum.Thomas Aquinas deals in Catena aurea steadily one gospel after another. He comments them by quotations of authorities, since those excerpts give numerous information's about the four gospels. Thomas takes permanently all four gospels into consideration and uses them a complement and explanation if each biblical text. He especially reflects missing and distinctive statements. His procedure agrees with those scalars, who tried before to refute the opinion that the gospel texts show contradictions. This harmonistic effort is illustrated in the East Middle German Translation of Catena aurea super Marcum. (shrink)

Belief and credal commitment sometimes seem to make less and less sense in the West. A kind of 'cultural amnesia' has taken hold, where formal religious adherence begins to seem almost unthinkable. This is especially so for the idea of divine revelation. Robyn Horner argues this means we need to re-evaluate how theology proceeds, focusing not so much on beliefs but on experience. Exploring ways in which the experiential might open human beings up to divine possibility, the author turns (...) to phenomenology because it seeks to examine unrestrictedly what is given through involved encounter. Bringing phenomenology and poststructuralism together, Horner develops the idea of revelation as an 'event' wherein God interrupts and exceeds human experience, affecting and transforming it. This striking concept, named but largely unexplored by theology, articulates a notion of supernatural revelation which now starts to appear both coherent and plausible. (shrink)

"At once rigorous, insightful, and accessible.... the most thorough study yet available on the phenomenological treatment of God as gift in Marion and Derrida. Invaluable reading for those concerned with the theological promise of contemporary Continental philosophy."-Thomas A. Carlson, University of California, Santa Barbara.

How can we be certain that software is reliable? Is there any method that can verify the correctness of software for all cases of interest? Computer scientists and software engineers have informally assumed that there is no fully general solution to the verification problem. In this paper, we survey approaches to the problem of software verification and offer a new proof for why there can be no general solution.

How can we be certain that software is reliable? Is there any method that can verify the correctness of software for all cases of interest? Computer scientists and software engineers have informally assumed that there is no fully general solution to the verification problem. In this paper, we survey approaches to the problem of software verification and offer a new proof for why there can be no general solution.

This paper argues that the difference between contemporary software intensive scientific practice and more traditional non-software intensive varieties results from the characteristically high conditionality of software. We explain why the path complexity of programs with high conditionality imposes limits on standard error correction techniques and why this matters. While it is possible, in general, to characterize the error distribution in inquiry that does not involve high conditionality, we cannot characterize the error distribution in inquiry that depends on software. Software intensive (...) science presents distinctive error and uncertainty modalities that pose new challenges for the epistemology of science. (shrink)

We can imagine a world in which ectogenesis provides a safe gestating space that eliminates maternal morbidity and mortality while maximising healthy outcomes for babies. In this world, women, no longer physically—and visibly—pregnant, are no longer economically, socially or physically disadvantaged due to the potential for pregnancy and birth. Because everyone can access the same technology, women are able to work without fear of pregnancy-related discrimination or restrictions, and health disparities among individuals in gestation and birth based on socioeconomic status (...) are eliminated. This imagining allows us to explore the ethical and social underpinnings of such a world, and consider how to achieve it in our current paradigm. Having explored the freedom and equality that is possible in an ideal hypothetical where all have equal access to such technologies, we can now imagine that same world without ectogenesis: women, no longer economically, socially or physically disadvantaged due to pregnancy and birth, despite still becoming pregnant. Such is the potential political perspective and provocation that can be spurred on by discussion of ectogenesis. As Cavaliere argues, the technological reality of ectogenesis may not achieve the freedom and equality that …. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that forecasting presents us with a paradox. Our ability to make reasonable and accurate medium to long term social and technological forecasts is demonstrably dismal. The gap between what actually happens and what was predicted is usually huge. Promoters and technological forecasters continue to provide us with wide varieties of technological futures. The paper introduces a tentative typology of technology futures as a framework for empirical work on failed technology futures. Sociological, psychological and historical explanations (...) are considered for the forecasting paradox. But primarily I argue this is an ethical question. Forecasting is akin to promising and it is in this light it ought to be assessed. Forecasters are accountable for their forecasts in the same way I may be held accountable for my promises. (shrink)

Theories of epistemology have come a long way since Leucippus’ account of objects emitting copies of themselves that are taken up by the senses and presented to the soul, but much of modern psychology and epistemology are still based upon a representational theory of knowledge -- that there is something in our head which ‘stands for’ the things in our world. This view has been challenged since Aristotle by an alternative view that knowledge is simply a change in the organism (...) such that the organism better fits within its world -- in short, knowledge as an adaption. Recent advances in philosophy, psychology and artificial intelligence reinforce this functional conception of knowledge and give us a valid and consistent way of understanding meaning and intelligence. In this paper, I articulate this alternative epistemology and lay out its implications for intelligences of the artificial kind. (shrink)

Software-intensive systems are ubiquitous in the industrialized world. The reliability of software has implications for how we understand scientific knowledge produced using software-intensive systems and for our understanding of the ethical and political status of technology. The reliability of a software system is largely determined by the distribution of errors and by the consequences of those errors in the usage of that system. We select a taxonomy of software error types from the literature on empirically observed software errors and compare (...) that taxonomy to Giuseppe Primiero’s Minds and Machines 24: 249–273, (2014) taxonomy of error in information systems. Because Primiero’s taxonomy is articulated in terms of a coherent, explicit model of computation and is more fine-grained than the empirical taxonomy we select, we might expect Primiero’s taxonomy to provide insights into how to reduce the frequency of software error better than the empirical taxonomy. Whether using one software error taxonomy can help to reduce the frequency of software errors better than another taxonomy is ultimately an empirical question. (shrink)